Peter Emmerson

5.3 Let’s get rid of dichotomies.

 In his work Elias draws attention to the problem of dichotomies and the way in which they are interdependent with a static view of the universe. The word dichotomy derives from metaphysics arguing that our experience can be understood in terms of pairs of opposites such as ‘Good and Evil’, famously addressed by Nietzsche who was critical of such a style of analysis because it gives the impression that there is nothing in between the two extremes. I would go even further and suggest that in reality neither good nor evil exists; they are ideals, products of the mind of Homo clausus. Hegel had tried to sort out the problem of the frigidity of dialectics (another word for dichotomies) by locating them in history, thereby imbuing them with movement and energy. From this perspective, dialectics indicate points of conflict between people, differences of opinion which are eventually resolved, often through war, to form other dialectics and so on: history from the Hegelian perspective is a process of becoming, in time we move closer and closer to the ideal, very much as Aristotle argued.

In recognizing the idealism in Hegel’s analysis, Marx carried out a reform by grounding dialectics in human survival activity: conflict is not a matter of differences of opinion, it is based in the battle for resources. However, as pointed out in 4.2.2, this modification didn’t fully remedy the problem because he failed to see the need for a more thorough scientific clean up of Hegel’s theometaphysics. By importing a theometaphysical concept, the dialectic, into his model, Marx had installed an idealist, anti-scientific concept to drive its functioning and the rest of his analysis. Thus instead of being more measured about the validity of his model he was certain.

If we adopt Elias’ view and develop new process concepts which are more reality-oriented, we will get better access to sociological material and, concomitantly, distance ourselves from idealism: we will in fact be more social scientific. Marx, like Hegel, begins with the ideal model and imposes it on the real, but characterizes it as science; in fact this is more like philosophy. Science works from a theory, which may be ideal, and checks it against reality; if it doesn’t work, the model is modified or thrown out. The classes that Marx discovers, the proletariat and bourgeoisie, derive from his dialectical beliefs and as such are logical impositions upon social experience, not suitable for testing. They are pure, rational constructs in a dialectical system that served the needs of Marx’ ideals, rather than his scientific question. Consequently, Marx and his followers were far too over-confident in his findings which in turn oiled the wheels for their premature application to real social situations. If it had been treated more realistically as a model for testing, then perhaps it would not have been used at all. Instead, as with psychoanalysis, the theory was checked-out in the real world where real people suffered as experimental guinea pigs, justified by a conviction in the truth of the model based on ideals. Thus, ironically, too many of those desperate for emancipation were subjected to new types of abuse and exploitation by those who succumbed to Marx’ religious zeal as he proselytized its pseudo-scientific truth: ref the Communist Manifesto.

The other sociologists, Comte et al, covered in this essay are guilty of the same mistake; but not Elias. The process approach steers us away from such extreme positions, getting us to focus on the material highlighted by Nietzsche between the ideal limits of any dichotomy or dialectic. Elias suggests the use of continua, employing sociological concepts that are more sensitive to patterns of change such as ‘involvement’ and ‘detachment’. There is a much more constrained importation of ideals here that gets rid of the respective theometaphysical notions subjective and objective. ‘Involvement’ and ‘detachment’ are foreign to the language of an alien like Homo clausus; they are much more human, the sort of language relevant to the experience of Homines aperti. They denote the level of human value an idea contains: involved being high in value; detached being low. However, we are always in a relative state as regards these extremes; we are therefore to some degree relatively involved/relatively detached. Emotions, values etc. cannot be renounced they are just allowed greater or lesser impact on our words and deeds.