Peter Emmerson

Glossary of terms.

Thact: I-orientated; homo clausus; homines aperti.  Thact is a new verb that I use in an attempt to dissolve an artificial division between ‘thought’ and ‘action’ that has developed in relation to formal analyses such as those carried out by philosophers and their allies who operate with an I-oriented approach, as per Descartes, which favours development of notions such as mind as separate and above body – ‘I think therefore I am’.  Norbert Elias suggested we call this image of people – ‘homo clausus’ or closed person.  Sociologists would benefit from seeing themselves as always connected, ‘open people’ (Elias, 1978) or ‘homines aperti’.

Habitus: intuitive and experiogenetic.  Habitus is a concept I learned from Norbert Elias who wanted to dispense with damaging notions such as personality that mislead us by giving precedence to genetic/biological influences  above those of  experience/learning, a way of thacting typical of homo clausus.  He makes a crucial point that we are less dominated by our biology than any other life-form – we have a remarkable capacity for learning and controlling our biological predispositions.  I often hear people describe their thacting as instinctive.  This is, I would argue, a misnomer.  In fact we are overwhelmingly creatures of intuition rather than instinct: at this moment I can only offer up my reflexes as evidence of significant instinctive thacting, which, as far as we know, require only spinal cord involvement with little involvement of our brains.  However, even reflexes develop interdependently with experience as disease processes show.  In other words we develop a habitus rather than are given a personality defined at conception.

Unlike so many sociologists Elias does not discount biological processes altogether.  In positing habitus he wanted to emphasize developmental interdependencies between genetic and sensory/experiential processes.  From this perspective our habituses never stop changing as long as we are alive.  I like to think that our genes predispose us to make cerebral connections with experiences to form our habitus.  This approach allows us to dissolve another artificial separation typical of homo clausus between genetics and experience, often described in terms of nature-nurture or more generally as rational-empirical.  Correspondingly, our personalities are natural and rational.  In contrast our habitus is neither genetic nor experiential, rational nor empirical, it is experiogenetic.  Everything we are is an interdependent process of development involving genes and experience which privileges neither.  Our habitus is like a compound that develops in our brain structured by a series of processes which involve interdependent correspondences between our genetic structures/predispositions and our experience/learning.  So much of our experience is mediated by our contact with others, language use being a very influential component making our habitus overwhelmingly figurational.  Processes of genetic and sensory experience cannot be separated as they presuppose each other – they interdepend.  Everything about us is experiogenetic; intuitive rather than instinctive.

Figuration/figurational.  Norbert Elias wanted to develop properly sociological language to facilitate understanding of sociological processes.  Figuration is a very important example.  Figuration is a process concept that as far as I can see is meant to reorient sociological perceptions and understanding by making them more connected with realities.  Interdependently, in doing this we develop a more reality congruent habitus and become homines aperti rather than homo clausus.  Correspondingly we are facilitated to explore connectedness and processes rather than statics.  Homo clausus conceives sociological evidence as closed, discrete units such as family, class, tribe and society, which give a misguided impression that sociological evidence is somehow thing-like, static and separate from us who study it, which it never is.  Homines aperti see connectedness through figurations which are transitory ‘webs if interdependence’ (Elias, 1978) that we are always caught up in.  From this perspective ‘social’ is replaced by ‘figurational’.

Influence.  As someone schooled in physical engineering I associate power with discrete machines, whether car engines or nuclear power stations.  Physical engineers can investigate and calculate how powerful such machines are very successfully using a causal analysis of work done over a period of time: a 10 watt light bulb being half as powerful as another of 20 watts.  We can use a similar approach to estimate human bodily power.  However, human figurations are bound together by much more intangible yet strong forces as webs/networks of interdependencies: human figurations are not discrete, material ‘things’ physically screwed or bolted together that can be analysed causally.  Correspondingly, from my perspective ‘power’ is an insufficiently reality congruent concept that reifies figurational processes allowing inadequate engagement with figurational processes.  Accordingly, it needs replacing.  To start with we might use ‘influence’.

Figurations are comprised of people whose bodies have physical ‘power’ which needs translating sociologically as ‘influence’.  Punching someone is a very manifest, violent thact that can be analysed causally in terms of physical power: a physical engineer might look for a well-known cause of violence such as excessive alcohol use.  However, this would only be a partial explanation as there are many significant sociological/figurational forces that interdepend with alcohol use that cannot be isolated in a causal chain: not all intoxicated people react violently.  Habitus factors as self-control, shame, fear, self-esteem, need for vengeance, training linked with figurational pressures such as onlookers, ethnic acceptance of violence etc., may well have come together to trigger this violent thact but didn’t cause it.  By assessing figurational processes using influence we get a more realistic, accurate picture of all those interdependencies involved in a violent thact.  I am not saying that using ‘influence’ solves our difficulties with ‘power’.  However, I do believe that ‘influence’ is a step in a more realistic direction that encourages us to abandon ‘power’ as a notion that causally over-simplifies our sociological perceptions.  ‘Influence’ grounds us in complexity and interdependencies.

Theometaphysician: a priest, philosopher or pure mathematician whose job it is to establish absolute truths.

Engineering.  I want to replace ‘science’ with ‘engineering’.  Science is a theometaphysical, over-idealized, systemic, thing-like notion that is designed to promote a belief that mundane physical realities are governed by absolute truths.  These absolute truths are in fact made by people to control those anxieties and fears that interdepend with our comparatively uncertain everyday experiences.  As a more appropriate notion, ‘engineer’ rather than ‘scientist’ engages much more directly and effectively with our mundane experiences allowing us to get to grips with real problems.  Engineers are grounded in comparatively uncertain mundanities rather than high flown pure mathematical fantasies.  Physical scientists and pure mathematicians want to explore Mars, physical engineers want to build more efficient batteries.  Social scientists want to understand inequality, domination, class etc., all things that reify figurational mundanities.  Figurational engineers want to tackle abuse of influence; especially violent thacts, comparative differences in life expectation, health, wealth etc.  Science is a philosophical project, a search for absolute truth guided by pure mathematical standards as Karl Popper showed in The Logic of Scientific Discovery.  Engineers use mathematical tools to sort out real problems by developing technology that works within agreed tolerances, + or – a millimetre: absolute accuracy is not obtainable.  I want to suggest that we sociologize science by renaming it engineering.  Engineering is more verbal and hands-on, thereby more processual suggestive of what we do in tackling real material problems, rather than ideal nonsenses.  Sociologists are figurational engineers.

Theometaphysician: a person whose job is to construct absolute truths using theological, metaphysical and/or mathematical techniques.  Often involves all three but can rely on just one.

A-t heuristic: a derivation of Tversky & Kahneman’s well tried concept.  In one instance they used it to explain how we make judgements based on previous experiences which are always biased.  I want to suggest that our habitus is in part structured by ‘heuristics’ as taken for granted packages of learning that help us engage with and interpret our mundane experiences.  There is a similarity between heuristic and Piaget’s concept of ‘schema’.  I want to suggest that some heuristics have more numerous and significant connections are more influential and take precedence over others.  These heuristics ground our feelings of fear and anxiety facilitating us to take control of our comparatively uncertain mundane experiences, especially when we encounter confusion.  These are ‘truth hubs’ that comprise our ‘go to’ beliefs developed by theometaphysicians who have developed techniques of certainty from which we have derived absolute truths of which there are two: supernatural/religious – oriented to sacred texts; metaphysical/secular – oriented to logical verbal (philosophy) and logical numerical (pure mathematics) analytics.