Giddens
Giddens
Giddens wrote in part to explain theoretical failure in sociology. Parsonian and Marxian sociologies privileged large structural forces such as common values and class and were seen as too inflexible and unresponsive to change. Such structural models ignored to a large extent real people’s lives in terms of their personal, diverse and mundane experiences. Alternatively, Weber’s more individualistic approach could not explain adequately structural forces that pattern everyday mundane experiences. Sociologists needed to clear out this ‘structure-agency’ dichotomic road block and find ways of analysing and explaining real people’s lives in more adequate, scientific fashion.
Elias had advocated a properly sociological, process approach where change was automatically accommodated. Giddens however took a different tack, incorporating aspects of Elias’ emphasis on process, his concept of ‘structuration’ being a prominent example. However, in order to ensure that his model had credence, he sought support in philosophical logical discourse: philosophers find credibility by using idealistic techniques of logic to establish absolute truths. Such discourses find expression in our everyday language – to be logical is to be correct. Giddens saw this as a means of guaranteeing scientific status in his work: logic=science. In so doing, I would argue he made a big mistake because in using idealistic philosophical method he could not achieve sufficient engagement with any social reality he tried to describe and explain. If you read The New Rules of Sociological Method you see a series of attempts to reject Marx, Weber, Durkheim et al. in favour of philosophical models according to 1960s’ fashion, especially hermeneutics and critical theory.
In trying to sort out structure and agency he moves from a position of ‘dualism’ to one of ‘duality’. Structure is joined to agency in this discursive sleight of hand and is transformed into what at sounds like a process concept – ‘structuration’. In fact, it is just a re-jigging of what was previously described as a dualism. This is what happens when adopting a philosophical modus operandi – realities can be ignored as long as rationale is preserved. Giddens cannot disentangle himself from sufficiently from idealistic discourse to engage with what is really happening; to do science. He analyses institutions by looking at their rules and resources and unsuccessfully tries to fit people in as structuring agents. This style of analysis is not that different from either Parsons or Marx who built a logical models and proceeded to apply them to experience no matter how they disagreed with facts. Such an approach is philosophical and doomed to failure because it privileges logic over reality congruence.
After dealing with social systems Giddens fits in people calling them ‘structuring agents’. This idea emanates from existential philosophy. Most of our daily experience is routine, unexceptional, unquestioned actvity or what he terms ‘practical consciousness’. However, from time to time we encounter unintended consequences as our routines fail and have to deploy our ‘discursive consciousness’ to think or ‘reflect’ upon unexpected occurrences. Whatever conclusion is reached by such reflection, restructures our routine systems and so on: structuration. This is neat, logical process of outcome and feedback, society as cybernetics not unlike Parsons. It however, totally underestimated social complexities: what about emotional responses for example?
Giddens also embarks on an analysis of our modern condition. He is aware that business is operating more and more beyond state boundaries and control, as globalization facilitated by technological change gathers pace in a search for cheap labour and improved profits. Pre-modern experiences were for most people local. Such comparatively small spaces were habitually understood and time passed as a shared experience for locals: land changes as seasons come and go. Such experiences become disembedded as global forces grow in magnitude changing our understanding of space and time. Two variables that were at one dependent on one another are quickly separated as local knowledge becomes comparatively insignificant. We can have salads in mid-winter, have sunny holidays during December. People are moving globally and exporting their habits: curry has become a staple in British people’s diet rather than Yorkshire pudding. We converse across time zones, across massive spaces to loved ones down-under. Our experiences are carried out by proxy using money, we consult experts, we communicate using technology such as mobile phones. Our lives take on an appearance of being controlled by forces beyond our control – it’s a Runaway World! Such experiences require greater levels of reflexivity as face to face to relationships decline and trust is more difficult. Everywhere there is risk where once there was predictability. In such conditions of insecurity we look for fundamentals, things in which we can believe. We are confronted with choices about who we live with, who we want to be. We look for relationships that are ‘pure’, we change our bodies to promote our needs etc. Even our basic identity is available to change: our ‘self’ becomes a project to meet whatever a world where rates of change are high demands – high modernity!