Peter Emmerson

6.3

Part of this exercise has been to relate the difficulties experienced by sociologists with those of natural scientists. I have attempted to show that even though physicists are generally more distant from idealism than social scientists, their programme is not free of it, partly related to their partnership with the figurations of mathematicians who worship absolute truth. Even though Einstein was more tentative than Newton as regards his findings, many clearly believe that the theory of relativity is an absolute truth in waiting. Natural scientists have become to some extent, the victims of their own success, overconfident in their techniques, especially mathematics, and less sceptical of their conclusions. A famous example is Stephen Hawking who is on record as saying that he is close to solving, mathematically of course, the riddle of universe. Another is Richard Dawkins who is aware of the relative uncertainty of our conclusions but is emphatic that science is correct and that there is incontrovertible evidence that God does not exist. The Hadron Collider at Cern is being used to find the particle of particles upon which all matter is founded. I have not the slightest intention of trying to denigrate the remarkable achievements of Professors Hawking and Dawkins, or the scientists who can construct and now run such an extraordinary machine as the Collider, nor all their colleagues past and present; the products of science are too impressive to treat them with anything other than respect. However, I do wonder about the possibility of realising such exalted goals in a universe so relatively uncertain. As I’ve tried to argue, idealism is misleading and has the capacity to allow the formation of unuseful conclusions. Mathematics is an application that in some aspects has become an ideal – the calculations of a Newton, an Einstein, a Heisenberg, a Hawking are speculations about absolute truths believed to be existent in the universe. This is secular deism. I suspect that their objectives will not be achieved, because in the universe I inhabit full of relative uncertainty, low on ideals, where question replaces question, as model replaces model, human values always enter into it!

On these grounds the essay has tried to offer a critique of models that rely on ideals such as ‘certainty’ and ‘uncertainty’, and that it is better to look at these as strong or weak beliefs respectively. I was listening one morning to a Reith lecture by the Astronomer Royal, Professor Sir Martin Rees, who was speculating about the limits of scientific knowledge. He stated that we know what happened fractions of a second after the ‘big bang’ that is believed to have formed the present universe. There was nothing tentative about this statement which surprised me and yet does not. I emailed him to ask why he was so certain and he very generously replied, referring to calculations based on background radiation and the levels of helium and deuterium in the universe. He went on to say that there is no credible alternative. Unlike the tenor of his lecture, this conclusion does contain an element of doubt in that an alternative may yet be developed. However, to all intents and purposes he is certain – why? His confidence is founded on the rock of mathematics, an ideal that justifies a particular belief over another. I am not sufficiently knowledgeable nor skilled to challenge Professor Rees’ conclusion on astronomical or mathematical grounds but if eminent scientists such as he are certain about their findings there is still plenty to do to promote a more tentative approach that espouses relative certainty/uncertainty, even after 400 years of scientific debate in which certainty has been increasingly questioned.

The continued level of resistance to a world that is relatively uncertain, especially where eminent scientists are concerned, is important. Some of the reasons for this have been addressed in this essay. However, even those who are not schooled in the nature of social theory could be sufficiently aware of the relative uncertainty of factual things, especially the highly educated. Nevertheless, high status people, some of whom are mentioned in this article, who are members of figurations that have enormous influence on decisions made in the UK, persist in making statements that accept uncritically the separation of politics from science from morality. Whilst some of those involved are professional ideologists such as Michael Portillo, others such as Lord Bingham and Professor Wolpert could surely in attitude be more discriminating. Yet Professor Wolpert was adamant that his science was not sullied by moral imperatives. This is interesting if only because of the incredibly sensitive area in which Professor Wolpert practices his science. Stem-cell research has stupendous implications for the future of human beings and yet one of the men who is managing this research is almost totally naïve or telling fibs. Einstein was distraught about the relationship between his work and the development of nuclear weapons: even though his moral purpose may well have been the good of humanity, he could not control the eventual outcome. Does not Professor Wolpert see that he is at least to some degree culpable for the future use of his work? Does he not see that he is part of a community that will override any idealism that directs his science if it can profit anyone?

The goings on at the UEA climatology department are a fine example of the relationship between moral belief and scientific practice: at least the climatologists know the importance of slanting the message because the message is at all times relatively uncertain. If people like Professor Wolpert understood this we would be less prone to accepting scientific findings as truths and more sceptical of their potential as forces for the benefit of people. This is not an argument against science, for I am proud to be a scientist; it is an argument against the idealism in science, it is an argument for the promotion of tolerance because we live in a relatively uncertain world, a view of the world that has been promoted by scientists above all, albeit clearly unaware of their idealism. Science is about knowledge held as relative uncertainties, not as uncertainties.