Peter Emmerson

  4.2.4 Weber

Idealism probably emerged as part of supernatural interpretations of experience but has one of its most potent modern influences through the notion of rationality. The argument is that logical analysis is our most trusted arbiter that guides us to the truth of things, or at least in the Cartesian/Popperian sense, sensitizes us to doubt. This approach was challenged by Max Weber who produced good evidence to suggest that there was not a single, definitive rationality, but, rationalities, contingent upon the goal to be achieved. Nonetheless, Weber, like Durkheim, was very much of the Kantian school, believing that we make sense of our factual experience using rational, ‘ideal’ models. On this basis he put together the notion of ‘ideal-types’ as the means by which we could measure social data in order to carry out a comparative analysis: how do we know the length of anything? – we use a standard measure graduated in an agreed unit such as inches. In sociology we need a similar standard by which to measure difference.

Perhaps the most famous example of an ideal-type is his model of bureaucracy which he used to understand real bureaucratic functioning by bringing to light the contrast between his sociological ideal model and real bureaucracies such as the civil service. Rationality in this sense is a method for the calculation of real historical contingencies rather than the means by which we elucidate the immanence of God’s laws or the absolute truth. What is rational for Weber depends on the level of emotion employed in the solution to a problem, or, whether we simply repeat the tried and tested methods of experience. Being rational is making a calculation of the means to an end, whether it is pleasing or not, whether it offends convention or not. Rationality is not a multi-purpose method of guaranteeing the absolute truth, it is a method of assessing the procedure most effective in achieving a goal, that is low on emotion and suspicious of the old way of doing things. Rational practice will therefore vary with the circumstances to which it is applied.

Weber argued that the rise in popularity of the rational style of analysis was evident during the Renaissance and has been growing ever since, not only with the emergence of institutionalised science, but also, capitalism. The latter, Weber argued, was the result of the activities of an ambitious group of people who saw the advantages to the profitability of their businesses of adopting the Protestant religious stance and a concomitant code of ethics which espoused the ascetic lifestyle of hard work and self denial: the Quakers are a well known example synonymous with famous modern companies such as Barclays, Cadbury (sadly no more) and Boots. What Weber does here is to highlight the way in ambitious business-oriented figurations used ideals as an element in their strategy for domination. When a position of dominance is achieved such that they become established, those same ideals are used to justify their actions and right to continue in control. Under capitalism you too can become wealthy if you work hard and are prudent with your earnings in accordance with God’s word, do as I say and do, or take the consequences!

However, by drawing our attention to the significance of ideals, either as a method of doing social science, or as a strategic method in the battle for social influence, Weber offers further evidence of a damaging connection with the Kantian approach by illustrating the correspondence between ideals and ordinary human day to day activity. Whilst this was a tactic in his disagreement with Marx over the origins of capitalism and the significance of religious ideals in social change, as far as I’m concerned it undermines the force of his own argument by privileging ideals. This is the really sticky part of his model. He sees the need to explore rationality as a historico-social process but then tempers this insight by including a version of Kant’s ‘categorical imperative’ – the ideal-type, to steady the ship on what he fears is its drift into relativist waters. Nevertheless, by making the connection between social experience and changes in rationality he pioneers another important step towards a relatively uncertain view.

Weber’s model provides support for two conclusions relevant to my argument: he offers insight into how ideals play their part as ideological tools in the dog fight for survival; he also explains how moral thinking is an integral part of rational practice. In this sense he adds weight to the arguments of Comte, Marx and Durkheim. The problem is that in using ideals he damaged his science.