Peter Emmerson

 4 Science and the gradual emergence of ‘relative uncertainty’.

4.1 Recap.

Having explored aspects of the general development of idealism and its relationship to authority and control, I now want to investigate science more specifically. I have tried to explain how the ideal notion of uncertainty has emerged as both an experience and an aspect of formal European discourse, in relation to the changes in the balance of social influence that saw the slow rise to dominance of the business-oriented figurations with an interest in a close examination of the possibilities of fully exploiting the natural world, one feature of which was the growth of science. Correlatedly, the old truth-finders, the theologians and philosophers, were of limited use and so their influence declined in favour of their idealist cousins the mathematicians. This change in the knowledge mix made the likelihood of an analysis connected to the idealist problem of endemic ‘uncertainty’ (as opposed to the realist ‘relative uncertainty’) more probable and with it the perception that people were constantly under threat from de-stabilizing forces such as relativism and anarchy. Even though I would contest the possibility of being a relativist or anarchist, as both are statements of ideal states of being emanating from the mouths and pens of theometaphysicians for those with a need for absolute control who have a lot to lose, the future during periods of intense social change can quite easily appear totally unpredictable, i.e. relativistic and anarchic. By helping open up the scientific enterprise, I believe the business-oriented figurations inadvertently made it easier to envisage an anti-idealistic perspective of ‘relative uncertainty’ beyond ‘uncertainty’, even though on first appearances the latter is all consuming.

Such an outcome is I believe an important aspect of the legacy of later science as greater levels of realism develop undermining the early utopianism that spoke of God’s laws of nature. However, there is still a long way to go as Hawking & Mlodinow point out – truth-finders are still in search for the Grand Design. Nonetheless, the latter title is a sign that influential scientists have less idealistic goals are in mind, as Design replaces Law. Relative uncertainty really does threaten idealism because it relegates the tools of the traditional truth-finders (faith, verbal and numerical logic) from ends in themselves to the means by which we investigate our problems. This is not relativism it is realism where processes have probabilities, not once and for all outcomes presided over by the all too human agents of Gods, the theometaphysicians. I believe that this important insight has come about because sociologists from Comte to Elias have developed models that explore the social variables in the formation of knowledge opening the way to a more realistic set of perceptions such that our experience is relatively uncertain, rather than the idealistic uncertain.

The intellectual love affair with the truth which spawned the concept of objectivity can be formally traced back to ancient Greek theometaphysicians such as Plato and Aristotle, who have dominated western intellectual life ever since: see Bertrand Russell’s History of Western Philosophy; Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy and Twilight of the Idols. Relatedly, the issues they and their contemporaries debated have been subjected to constant revision, whether from a theological standpoint by writers such as Augustine and Aquinas, or, more secular notables such as Descartes and Locke in the 17^th century, Hume and Kant in the 18^th century, and Karl Popper in the 20^th. This long programme of acceptance and rebuttal, is dominated by the research of ideals in the attempt to establish the absolute truth; a desperate hunt for the certainty and stability concomitant with peace of mind, bodily safety and maintenance of social influence. The development of formal science in the 17^th century, connected with the formation of institutions such as the Royal Society, constituted a shadowy revival of the anti-idealist challenge that had always accompanied the doctrines of absolute truth. The practitioners of this new style of philosophy, natural philosophy, such as Newton, seemed on the surface largely unaware of the radical nature of their enterprise, thoroughly schooled as they were in theometaphysical truth-finding frames of reference, especially the new mathematics.

On one level it is surprising, considering the level of scepticism associated with any investigation of the natural world, that massive science as we know it ever got off the ground, surpassing anything ever achieved by the likes of Archimedes. Clearly science prospered in spite of significant resistance from many theometaphysicians to the extent that it eventually challenged the dominance of the theologians in particular. Nevertheless, as referenced above, the old school of theometaphysics remains alive and well, still foraging for the ideal in order to drive out personal and social insecurity, as well as bolstering the needs of the established figurations by providing the authority needed to manage the process of order. The belief in the sovereignty of mathematics is directly commensurate with the deistic model of a universe governed by God’s laws. Even though scientists are less certain of themselves nowadays, their commitment to mathematics is one good reason for the survival of idealism, God and all. Certainly since Hume’s discomforting conclusion that factual knowledge is a matter of probabilities, the capacity for idealism in scientists has been tempered by a more secular, relative view that speaks of theory rather than law: compare Einstein to Newton. Thus, formal science is evidence that certain people were willing to think the unthinkable; that there is relative uncertainty, even in a mathematical universe.