Why You Shouldn’t Believe Anything You’re Told – 3.1
3 The Applied Sciences: anti-idealism.
3.1 A possible anti-idealist response to understanding contemporary authoritarianism through the use of figurations.
In tackling this question I want to draw attention to the difficulties experienced by anti-idealistic forces such as applied sciences. One possibility is to explore the re-emergence of authoritarianism in late 20th century Britain from a social scientific point of view using the concept of figuration. This might at first glance seem a strange venture, as sociology is not usually associated with the more usual candidates for membership of the applied sciences such as computing, engineering or forensics. However, from my point of view the social sciences are about the application of a scientific approach to people and therefore qualify as applied sciences. In addition and more pertinently as regards this essay, the main factor that defines membership of the applied sciences is the existence of a high level of what Elias termed ‘reality congruence’ (a close correspondence with the facts), higher even than theoretical physics. My argument is that high reality congruence is negatively correlated with idealism: the nearer you commune with the facts the less opportunity there is for idealism. In this sense we cannot be non-idealistic for there are no definitive ends to a continuum: we are always influenced by our values, thus there are just degrees of realism/idealism. Because of its close proximity to the facts applied science is I believe, anti-idealistic.
I want to return to certain features of the re-emergence of authoritarianism in British politics since the late 1970s. A figurational analysis could examine the network of interdependencies between what on the surface appear to be groups in conflict such as the Conservative and Labour Parties. What has always intrigued me was to hear Tony Blair and Gordon Brown speak of their admiration for Margaret Thatcher, someone who did serious damage to the Labour Party and its allies. Foucault for example might have cited this as evidence of the dominance of a new authoritarian discourse that emerged in the late 1970s and which has patterned political thinking of all varieties ever since. If this were the case, it would be extremely difficult for those who were resistant to its arguments to do anything other than conform, or at best post their disagreement in a manner that is consistent with its rules of engagement: which is arguably why Foucault got involved in taking action at a local rather than national level, where discursive forces were less well organised to resist.
As with other structuralist types of analysis, this style of argument under-represents the people to whom it supposedly relates, in favour of the discursive systems they use, thereby turning a blind eye to the web of interrelationships that bound Thatcher, Blair and Brown together as a political figuration, where certain styles of thinking, speaking and acting became acceptable. None of this trio operated alone or with personal freedom; their thinking and behaviour was moderated by those around them. In other words giving a style of government the title of a person such as Thatcherism is misleading because it ignores the complexities of the web of social connections and influences that bind people to each other, in a similar style of authoritarian government, even though they are enemies. Nonetheless, such structural processes, be it social or discursive, should not dominate the analysis to the detriment of the people involved. Whilst Margaret Thatcher did not drive her perspective through single-handedly, as the politics of individualism would suggest, she was part of a figuration of people with significant amounts of influence who marshalled their allies to bring about change, moving the British economy back towards a market model and reducing the activities of certain parts of government. A figurational approach favours neither structural nor individualistic perspectives by exploring the processes of social influence that bind people together.
Politics is a rich ground for idealism and therefore often dominated by flights of fancy rather than factual understandings. In the recent British election of 2010, there was one loud and constant call, that seemed to unite the parties of whichever persuasion; that Britain needed ‘strong and stable government’ as though this alone would guarantee our future well being. I never heard anyone saying we want competent people to govern, of any variety. The suggestion is that stable, strong government which results from an overall majority in parliament is a precursor to success. This is a view that I believe does not stand the test of the material facts. Both Thatcher and Blair had landslide majorities and neither made Britain ‘Great’ again. No! – at the last election the old ideals of strong and stable government were peddled out once more, the ideals that would help one or other figuration to establish an authoritarian government where they could implement their preferred plan with minimum resistance, thoroughly mixed with ideals to disguise their incompetence and abuse of social influence. Such talk of stability is an ingredient in an orthodox meal of ideals that goes back to ancient Greece and probably further, useful to justify authoritarian approaches in established figurations, served up by the theometaphysical truth-finders. This is not driven by discursive rules, it is driven by figurations of people competing for influence: the ideals are the technology of influence use by people in figurations with similar ambitions of control. Nevertheless, in places where democratising and civilising processes are well developed, such that there exist large numbers of figurations of people with high levels of self-control, there is enough relative detachment around in those with significant social influence to make it more difficult to quietly exterminate those who resist like Thomas More. Even so, this does not guarantee the development of a surge in interest in more reality congruent applied sciences as idealism is still highly valued.