Peter Emmerson

 2. The Socio-psychogenesis of the Ideal of Uncertainty: changes in patterns of social influence exploring the interdependencies between the rise of business-oriented figurations, a more material type of idealism, and a decline in authoritarian governance.

2.1 The rise and fall in influence of monarchic figurations: some processes in the decline of the theological truth-finders.

There are good reasons for believing that nothing in mundane human experience is certain, even though very influential constructors of ideals, namely, theometaphysicians, have for millennia, certainly in Europe, furnished us with absolute truths and in the process distracted us from thinking otherwise. One very important reason for the manufacture of such knowledge is to supply elite groups with the authority necessary to govern; a point I learned from Zygmunt Bauman. The holders of social influence use absolute truths to counter resistance in the form of alternative argument, especially in more democratic countries. If such a tactic is unsuccessful, then the means of violence can be deployed, justified on the grounds that those in opposition were given a fair chance to come to their senses.

Under the figuration headed by Henry VIII, no such caution was felt necessary. The English monarchy at this time felt so confident in its capacity to govern that it was willing to relax its hold on the truth by throwing out the authority provided by the Roman Catholic Church, in order to replace it with a more convenient Protestant message. The ensuing conflict was accompanied by doctrinal ferment, which, as far as I can see, contributed to opening the way for a more secular system of absolute truths: the balance of social influence was moving even more in favour of the monarchical figuration and away from the priests, and for the rest, it may well have been a matter of ‘we don’t care because it has nothing to do with us’. Consequently, most of the English agents of God in their retreat, took on more of a support function rather than directly competing with monarchical interests. For example, the unhelpful and threatening religious dissident Thomas More, was given time to adjust his perception of the truth, before being dispatched to oblivion by the more influential monarchic figuration which by then had much less need to worry about possible condemnation from the Church.

Just over a hundred years later we see a more reasoned justification of the subservience of the Church in Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan. Hobbes’ book is a very good example of the way influential figurations use verbal logic (philosophy) to justify their activities. As the level of influence of monarchic figurations in Britain increased there came a point, the Reformation, at which they could bring one of their greatest rivals, the Church, to heal. Part of the reinforcement of this change in the patterning of authority was to lower the volume of ecclesiastical truth statements in favour of more secular, metaphysical forms of truth-finding from philosophers such as Hobbes, and mathematicians. Interdependently, this offered more scope for arguments from relative uncertainty. For a justification of this way of discussing social influence see the Introduction to The Court Society by Norbert Elias.

My argument is that God’s truth-finders played a less directorial role in patterning daily life after the Reformation. This is not to deny that their influence was still substantial: the significance of puritan ethics in relation to the activities of revolutionaries such as Oliver Cromwell is well documented, let alone their connection to the development of capitalism as explored by Max Weber. However, I believe that these were part of democratising changes interdependent with the decline in religious control and the concomitant growth of forms of secular authority, initially monarchic then business-oriented. What is interesting is that by the 17^th century, even the more secular truths used to justify the right to rule such as the personal superiority of the monarchical figurations were under threat, as Oliver Cromwell’s promotion to Lord Protector testifies. True, the monarchical groups re-established their dominance after Cromwell died, but his emergence as a non-royal leader was a shot across the bows for monarchies, an indication that social processes were in motion that would permanently threaten their ancient hold on influence.

I often think experts on political revolutions take too little account of the emancipatory impetus that resulted in the British revolution, by giving precedence to the events of 1789 in France over a hundred years later. One might argue that the potential for a republic in Britain was too raw in the 17^th century, even though the democratising forces were strong enough to play their part in the execution of a monarch. I suppose the British experience is seen as a revolution that failed, in contrast to France. However, whilst the British monarchy was restored in a watered down form, it did not crush the republican impulse, which can be seen to re-emerge in America and then France where many of those who were sympathetic to the revolution ended up: were the events just over a hundred years later in 1775 and 1789 a matter of unfinished business? My point is this; that from the 17^th century onward there was a continuation of the gradual contraction of ecclesiastical influence, given further impetus by the decline in authority of monarchical figurations. These changes were interdependent with the growth in influence of groups with commercial interests partnered by truth-finders of an even more secular leaning.