Why You Shouldn’t Believe Anything You’re Told – Preamble
De-idealisation and the development of Relative Uncertainty: an aspect of the Sciencization Process
Preamble
This essay does not claim the status of a conventional learned academic article. It is a beginning, an exploration of some of my ideas, posted here because I work outside of the normal academic nexus. Whilst this has advantages, giving me the relative autonomy to pursue my interests, it does leave me vulnerable where critical discussion is concerned. I therefore offer up my essay in all humility, for I am very much aware of my fallibility, my relative uncertainty. Where you believe me to be mistaken tell me so. My hope is that the essay has fertility, and can be the ground on which further, more significant produce can be grown.
The analysis examines certain aspects of the changing use of ideals, especially the truth. As far as I can see ideals are an expression of our ability to think about perfection, the search for which has had enormous influence over human affairs. One very important example concerns our thinking about what is right and wrong, otherwise known as morals or ethics. For example, the Ten Commandments can be seen as a set of statements from the Old Testament that tell us about what God knows to be true. They are ideals that provide us with a point of reference on how to think and behave, whether you believe in them or not. It is likely, even if you don’t believe, that you will have a similar set of beliefs that you hold as truths.
This ancient pattern of belief in ideals still holds enormous significance for us today. However, I want to argue that there has been a gradual decline in the influence of ideals. This decline is plotted in this essay in relation to three interrelated processes: the rise to prominence of more and more people interested in pursuing a business-oriented approach to the problem of survival; the gradual spread of beliefs in the benefits of democratic systems of government; the dramatic growth in scientific practice and knowledge over the last 300 years or so.
For the method used to carry out this analysis I am much indebted to one of the greatest sociologists, Norbert Elias. Elias’ approach takes the social group as its basic unit of analysis. Groups, or what he terms figurations, are regulated by processes that involve complex sets of interdependencies that bind their membership together. Life is about change and the means by which we study it should be consonant with that fact. The essay is an attempt to apply this model to the problem of ideals such as truth.